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Jam v. International Finance Corporation:
The End of Absolute International
Organizational Sovereign Immunity and the
Argument for a Functional Immunity Regime
BRYCE HOLLANDER†

I. INTRODUCTION
On February 27, 2019, the United States Supreme Court decided
its first case regarding whether international organizations retained
absolute immunity from prosecution in U.S. courts—Jam v.
International Finance Corporation.1 In a stunning reversal of
judicial precedent, the Supreme Court found that international
organizations were no longer immune from suit.2 Absolute immunity
from suit was a right which international organizations have
traditionally enjoyed in the United States since the passage of the
International Organizations Immunities Act (“IOIA”) in 1945.3 The
IOIA stated that international organizational immunity was “the same
immunity as foreign governments enjoy,” which in 1945 meant
absolute sovereign immunity.4 However, in 1976, Congress passed
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) which created several
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1. Jam v. Int’l Fin. Corp., 139 S. Ct. 759, 772 (2019).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 764.
4. Id.
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exceptions to absolute sovereign immunity that allowed parties to sue
foreign sovereigns in U.S. courts.5 International organizations,
however, were generally thought to have retained their absolute
immunity from prosecution until Jam.6
In a 7-1 decision, the Supreme Court held: “The International
Organizations Immunities Act grants international organizations the
‘same immunity’ from suit ‘as is enjoyed by foreign governments’ at
any given time.7 Today, that means that the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act governs the immunity of international
organizations.”8 The Supreme Court correctly decided that, given the
historical and statutory context of the IOIA and the FSIA,
international organizations should enjoy the same restrictive
sovereign immunity as foreign governments.9 However, the majority
did not properly judge the impact that subjecting all U.S. based
international organizations, particularly international financial
institutions (IFI) and multilateral development banks (MDB), to the
commercial exception of the FSIA will have; nor did the majority
properly consider how to apply the FSIA’s exceptions to international
organizations under the new default rule.10 The most effective
solution to these issues will be for lower court’s to adopt the doctrine
of functional immunity; a doctrine which is used by the vast majority
of nations which host international organizations.11 Functional
immunity allows courts to apply the exceptions listed in the FSIA
while not unintentionally opening international organizations to a
myriad of suits.12 Functional immunity also provides individuals and
groups a proper forum to have their claims heard without
overwhelming U.S. courts with litigation.13

5. 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (1976).
6. Jam, 139 S. Ct. at 772.
7. Id.
8. Id. Only 8 Justices participated in the Jam decision. Justice Kavanaugh recused
himself from the proceedings, having participated in the prior D.C. Circuit panel of the case.
It is worth noting that he ruled in favor of the IFC.
9. Id. at 771-72. International monetary organizations and multilateral lending banks
are international organizations that provide financial assistance, typically in the form of
loans and grants, to developing countries in order to promote economic and social
development. The bulk of their activities are inherently commercial by definition.
10. Id. at 772.
11. Julian Arato, Equivalence and Translation: Further thoughts on IO Immunities in
Jam v. IFC, EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: TALK (Mar. 11, 2019),
https://www.ejiltalk.org/equivalence-and-translation-further-thoughts-on-io-immunities-injam-v-ifc/.
12. Id.
13. Id.; see also Carson Young, The Limits of International Organization Immunity: An
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II. THE CASE FACTS
The appellee in Jam was the International Finance Corporation
(“IFC”), a branch of the World Bank headquartered in Washington
D.C.14 The IFC is an international financial institution which offers
investment and advisement services to encourage private sector
development in less developed countries.15 Here, the IFC provided
loans to a subsidiary of Coastal Gujarat Power Limited, an Indian
company, to construct and operate the Tata Mundra Power Plant in
Gujarat, India.16 The IFC had, in accordance with their internal
policy, included within their loan agreement an Environmental and
Social Action Plan (“the Plan”) designed to protect surrounding
communities at the power plant.17 The agreement also stipulated that
the IFC “retained supervisory authority and could revoke financial
support for the project at any time,” if Coastal Gujarat did not comply
with the agreement’s provisions.18 The IFC Compliance Advisor
Ombudsman and an internal review board of the IFC conducted an
internal audit after the plant had been completed and concluded that
the Tata Mundra Plant’s construction and operations did not comply
with the Plan.19 However, the IFC did not compel Coastal Gujarat to
act in accordance with the Plan, institute punitive measures against
Coastal Gujarat, nor withdraw their financial support despite the
conclusions of the Ombudsman and internal review board.20
The appellant’s were Buddha Ismail Jam and a group of
fishermen, farmers, a local government entity, and a fishermen’s
trade union, all of whom lived and worked in the area near the Tata

Argument for a Restrictive Theory of Immunity Under the IOIA, 95 TEX. L. REV. 889, 908
(2017).
14. INTERNATIONAL
FINANCE
CORPORATION,
https://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/corp_ext_content/ifc_external_corporate_site/home
(2020).
15. INTERNATIONAL
FINANCE
CORPORATION,
https://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/corp_ext_content/ifc_external_corporate_site/about+i
fc_new (Last visited Mar. 22, 2020).
16. Jam, 139 S. Ct. at 767.
17. Id.; see also The World Bank, Environmental and Social Policies, (last accessed,
Mar. 1, 2020) https://projects.worldbank.org/en/projects-operations/environmental-andsocial-policies. Environmental and Social Action Plans are documents which gauge the
environmental and societal impact an IFC loan will have on the area receiving a loan. The
World Bank requires that these plans be drawn up any time the Bank loans money. The loan
receiver must strictly comply with the plan’s terms or face revocation of the loan and further
potential punishment.
18. Jam, 139 S. Ct. at 767.
19. Id.
20. Id.
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Mundra plant.21 They alleged that the plant’s construction had
devastated their local way of life.22 The claim was primarily based on
various torts which resulted from the plant’s operation, including
polluting the local water supply, contaminating the air, and killing off
the fish population.23 The plaintiffs further argued that they were the
third-party beneficiaries of the environmental and social terms of the
loan agreement.24 Thus, the IFC was not immune to their claims, and
even if it was immune, it had waived its immunity in dealing with
Coastal Gujarat.25
Jam sued in the District Court of the District of Columbia, which
dismissed the claims due to the IFC’s IOIA derived absolute
immunity.26 The Circuit Court agreed, noting that the IFC enjoyed
total immunity from prosecution under the IOIA and that the IFC did
not waive its immunity regarding this type of suit.27 The Supreme
Court granted certiorari limited to the first point, and analyzed
“whether the IOIA grants international organizations the virtually
absolute immunity foreign governments enjoyed when the IOIA was
enacted, or the more limited immunity they enjoy today.”28
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The theory of absolute sovereign immunity had long been in
practice in U.S. courts prior to Jam.29 In 1812, the Supreme Court
held in The Schooner Exchange v. M’Faddon that prospective
plaintiffs could not sue a foreign sovereign, even when those claims
related to the sovereigns commercial activities with the United
States.30 For more than a hundred years following the Schooner
Exchange case, U.S. courts applied the doctrine of absolute sovereign
immunity when hearing suits against foreign governments.31 A
21. Jam v. Int’l Fin. Corp., 172 F. Supp. 3d 104, 105 (D.D.C. 2016).
22. Jam, 139 S. Ct. at 763.
23. Id.
24. Jam v. Int’l Fin. Corp., 860 F.3d 703, 704-05 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
25. Id.
26. Jam, 172 F. Supp. 3d at 104.
27. Jam, 860 F.3d at 703.
28. Jam, 139 U.S. at 765.
29. See generally Joan E. Donoghue, Taking the “Sovereign” Out of the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act: A Functional Approach to the Commercial Activity Exception, 17
YALE J. INT’L L. 489 (1992).
30. See The Schooner Exchange v. M’Faddon, 11 U.S. 116, 134-35 (1812) (finding that
a private party could not sue a foreign sovereign and claim ownership of a French warship
docked and left in Philadelphia during the Napoleonic Wars).
31. Daniel T. Murphy, The American Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity: An Historical
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“significant number” of sovereign immunities cases arose during
World War I, as the increase in international shipping used to supply
the Entente war effort increased the number of international tort and
breach of contract claims in U.S. courts.32
After World War I the Supreme Court took steps to broaden the
concept of foreign sovereign immunity.33 The Court held in Berizzi
Bros. v. The Pesaro that all activities of a sovereign, including
commercial activities, were public in nature and thus immune from
U.S. prosecution.34 Notably, this wholesale adoption of absolute
sovereign immunity contradicted the State Department’s policy,
which stated that government owned entities engaged in commerce
were not entitled to absolute immunity from suit.35 In Compania
Espanola de Navegacion Maritima, S.A. v. The Navemar, Justice
Stone further expanded the concept of sovereign immunity by
asserting that foreign states received absolute immunity from suit by
“mak[ing] a diplomatic representation of the public ownership of the
property . . . [or] intervening in [] suit as a claimant.”36
The IOIA entered into force on December 29, 1945, in order to
grant international organizations of which the United States was a
member of “a legal status which is adequate to ensure the effective
performance of their functions and fulfillment of their purposes.”37
Prior to the IOIA’s passage, the United States operated under the
Analysis, 13 VILL. L. REV. 583, 587 (1968). It is important to note, however, that owing to
the United States lack of international land borders compared to other nations the vast
majority of these cases were confined to the realm of admiralty law. Cases did arise outside
of the admiralty law context, however. See, e.g., Oliver Am. Trading Co. v. United States of
Mexico, 5 F.2d 659 (2d Cir. 1924); see also, e.g., French Republic v. Board of Supervisors,
200 Ky. 18, 252 S.W. 124 (1923) (stating that, in general, U.S. courts overwhelmingly
upheld the doctrine of absolute sovereign immunity in these cases).
32. See, e.g., The Attualita, 238 F. 909 (4th Cir. 1916); see also, e.g., The Maipo, 252 F.
627 (S.D.N.Y. 1918); see also, e.g., The Pampa, 245 F. 137 (E.D.N.Y. 1917). Each of these
cases involved tort suits which would have resulted in the seizure of foreign registered ships
docked in U.S. ports. The various courts produced mixed opinions regarding whether this
seizure violated the ship owners’ immunity as a resident of a foreign sovereign. However,
the courts generally decided that the ships were protected under the doctrine of absolute
sovereign immunity. See supra note 30, at 496.
33. Berizzi Bros. v. The Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562, 574 (1926).
34. Id.
35. Green Haywood Hackworth, Digest of International Law, volume IV (Washington,
Government Printing Office, 1941), at p. 434. The State Department traditionally held the
role of defining the limits of foreign sovereign immunity. In retaliation for the outcome of
Berizzi Bros., the State Department repeatedly refused to grant requests of immunity unless
ordered to do so by a court.
36. 303 U.S. 68, 74-76 (1938); see also In re Muir, 254 U.S. 522, 532-33 (1921).
37. See generally Lawrence Preuss, The International Organizations Immunities Act, 40
AM. J. INT’L L. 332 (1946), www.jstor.org/stable/2193194.
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position that there was no obligation within international customary
law which extended sovereign immunity to international
organizations.38 Noting that international organizations almost
exclusively derived their funding from various foreign governments
and that the U.S. had become increasingly involved in international
organizational management following the end of WWII, Congress
passed the IOIA to safeguard their rights.39 Under the IOIA,
international organizations had the “same immunity” from suit “as is
enjoyed by foreign governments,” in essence codifying the regime of
absolute sovereign immunity as this was what foreign governments
enjoyed at the time.40
The doctrine of absolute sovereign immunity began to recede in
the decade following the issuance of the IOIA. In 1952, noting
developments within the field of sovereign immunity abroad, the U.S.
Department of State issued the Tate Letter.41 The State Department
announced that it would be formally abandoning the doctrine of
absolute sovereign immunity in favor of the rival restrictive theory of
sovereign immunity.42 The State Department justified this decision
by noting that restrictive sovereign immunity had already been
adopted by several western nations.43 The State Department asserted
that while a state’s Public Acts (Jure Imperii) retained absolute
immunity from prosecution, a state’s Private Acts (Jure Gestionis) no
longer enjoyed this same immunity.44 As a result, the Tate Letter
essentially allowed litigants the ability to sue foreign sovereigns for
their commercial activities.45 By 1976, this doctrine was codified by
Congress in the FSIA.46
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act had three objectives: to
transfer responsibility for immunity determinations to the judiciary,
to define and codify the restrictive theory of immunity, and to
provide a uniform set of standards for litigation against foreign states

38. Id. at 333.
39. See generally supra note 38.
40. 22 U.S.C. § 288a(b) (1945).
41. Robert M. Jarvis, The Tate Letter: Some Words Regarding Its Authorship,
55 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 465, 469–71 (2015).
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Mark B. Feldman, The United States Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 in
Perspective: A Founder’s View, 35 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 302, 303 (1986) (stating that the
U.S. became the first nation to codify the law of foreign sovereign immunity by statute).
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and government agencies.47 The FSIA codified several exceptions to
foreign sovereign immunity, including whether the foreign state
expressly waived their immunity (§ 1605(a)(1)), committed a tort in
the United States (§ 1605(a)(5)), or seized property in violation of
international law (§ 1605(a)(3)).48 Perhaps most importantly for Jam,
the FSIA also exempted foreign sovereign immunity in cases
involving a foreign sovereign’s engagement in commercial activities
(§ 1605(a)(2)).49 There are three bases by which a plaintiff could sue
a foreign state for these commercial acts, including:
[An] action [] based upon a commercial activity
carried on in the United States by the foreign state; or
upon an act performed in the United States in
connection with a commercial activity of the foreign
state elsewhere; or upon an act outside the territory of
the United States in connection with a commercial
activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that act
causes a direct effect in the United States.50
Since the passage of the FSIA, the reference in the IOIA to the
immunity of foreign governments has generated confusion over
whether international organizations enjoyed absolute or restricted
immunity from prosecution.51 U.S. Circuit Courts have split on the
matter.52 For instance, in 1998, the District of Columbia Circuit
Court of Appeals held that the immunity of international
organizations remained as absolute in the present day as it was in
1945 despite the changes to the immunity of foreign states.53 In
Atkinson a woman who had filed for divorce in Maryland sought to
garnish her husband’s wages as alimony.54 The husband worked for
the Inter-American Development Bank and he asserted that the wages
he had earned could not be garnished because the wages of
international organization employees, like the organizations

47. Id. at 304-05.
48. 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (2016).
49. Id.
50. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (2016).
51. Jam, 139 S. Ct. at 768.
52. See, e.g., Atkinson v. Inter-Am. Dev. Bank, 156 F.3d 1335, 1336 (D.C. Cir. 1998),
as amended (Oct. 28, 1998), and abrogated by Jam v. Int’l Fin. Corp., 139 S. Ct. 759 (2019);
see also, e.g., Oss Nokalva, Inc. v. Eur. Space Agency, 617 F.3d 759, 765-66 (3d Cir. 2010).
53. Atkinson, 156 F.3d at 1336. Washington D.C. is the traditional forum for
international organization litigation in the United States due to D.C. being the headquarter
location for many international organizations.
54. Id.
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operations, enjoyed absolute immunity from prosecution.55 Finding
that the Inter-American Development Bank had not willfully
relinquished its traditional absolute immunity from prosecution in
this matter, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the appellant’s
wage garnishment claim.56
Crucially, Atkinson discussed the commercial activities
exception of the FSIA and whether international organizations were
subject to its provisions.57 The appellant argued that IOIA derived
international organizational immunity had been amended following
the passage of the FSIA.58 The court rejected this argument, finding
that the scope of immunity provided by the IOIA persisted beyond
the enactment of the FSIA, and that nothing in the text of the FSIA
implied that Congress had wished to apply the new exceptions of
foreign state immunity to international organizations.59 The D.C.
Circuit found that the text of the IOIA left “the responsibility for
updating the immunities of international organizations in the face of
changing circumstances” to the executive branch.60
Contrarily, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals held in Oss
Nokalva, Inc. v. European Space Agency that international
organizational immunity had in fact changed after the passage of the
FSIA in 1976.61 A New Jersey corporation provided software to the
European Space Agency (“ESA”), a designated international
organization.62 The corporation sued the ESA for breach of contract,
which the ESA defended by arguing that they enjoyed international
organizational immunity under the IOIA.63 The District Court for the
District of New Jersey ruled in favor of the corporation, finding that
the ESA had waived its immunity through previously signed
agreements and its organizing convention.64
The Third Circuit, while affirming the district court’s rejection
of the grant of summary judgment, did so by explicitly rejecting
55. Id. at 1337.
56. Id. at 1343.
57. Id. at 1339-40.
58. Id. at 1340-41 (The court did acknowledge, however, that the legislative history of
the IOIA did not express any guidance about “whether Congress intended to incorporate in
the IOIA subsequent changes to the law governing the immunity of foreign sovereigns.”).
59. Id. at 1341.
60. Id. at 1341.
61. Oss Nokalva, Inc., 617 F.3d at 764.
62. Id. at 758.
63. Id. at 760-61.
64. Id. at 760.
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Atkinson.65 The court stated that there remained a question as to
whether foreign sovereigns ever enjoyed absolute immunity from
prosecution.66
Critically, the majority rejected the Atkinson
contention that the IOIA’s delegation of authority to alter the
immunity of international organizations rested with the executive
branch.67 Instead, the court held that since Congress had not
specified whether sovereignty under the IOIA remained fixed in
1945, then it must be construed to dynamically change if the
sovereignty of foreign governments did.68 Thus, the Third Circuit
found that the immunity conferred by the IOIA adapted with the
general law of foreign sovereign immunity, and the FSIA’s
exceptions from immunity applied.69
Prior to Jam, the Supreme Court largely declined to rule on
whether international organizations retained absolute sovereign
immunity.70 However, one case did provide an early sign that the
exceptions listed in the FSIA could apply to entities outside the
traditional definition of a foreign sovereign.71 In 1992, Panamanian
and Swiss bond holders brought a breach of contract action against
the Central Bank of Argentina arising out of the lengthy amount of
time for payment on bonds the bank issued as part of a currency
stabilization plan.72 The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s
denial of Argentina’s motion for summary judgment, arguing that the
issuance of bonds to fund commercial activity satisfied the
“commercial activity” exception of the FSIA.73 Thus, the Court held
that whenever a foreign government or government entity participates
as a private player in an economic market, their actions are
sufficiently “commercial” under the FSIA.74 Crucially, for the
purposes of the commercial exception of the FSIA, it was irrelevant
to determine why the foreign sovereign participated in a market as a
private actor, only that it did so.75
65. Id. at 761-62.
66. Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 486 (1983) (noting that the
Supreme Court consistently deferred to executive branch decisions regarding whether to take
jurisdiction over foreign sovereigns).
67. Oss Nokalva, Inc., 617 F.3d at 764.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 764, 766.
70. See, e.g., Republic of Arg. v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607 (1992).
71. Id. at 620.
72. Id. at 609-10.
73. Id. at 610–11.
74. Id. at 614.
75. Id. at 617.
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IV. THE COURT’S REASONING
In Jam, Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the majority, affirmed
the Third Circuit’s viewpoint regarding the IOIA, finding that the
IOIA’s reference to “the immunity of foreign governments [was] a
general reference . . . and concluded that that the ‘IOIA should
therefore be understood to link the law of international organization
immunity to the law of foreign sovereign immunity, so that the one
develops in tandem with the other.’”76 Essentially, he decided that
the restrictive sovereign immunity that foreign governments enjoyed
under the FSIA applied to international organizations governed by
the IOIA, explicitly rejecting the Atkinson holding.77 He applied the
reference canon of legal construction to explain this restricted stance
on the privileges and immunities language of the IOIA.78 He defined
the reference canon as:
When a statute refers to a general subject, the statute
adopts the law on that subject as it exists whenever a
question under the statute arises . . . when a statute
refers to another statute by specific title, the
referenced statute is adopted as it existed when . . .
enacted.79
Finally, Chief Justice Roberts analyzed what the effect of subjecting
international organizations to the FSIA’s exceptions would have on
their operations.80
Chief Justice Roberts began his analysis by examining the
language of the IOIA.81 He found that the IOIA’s immunity rule was
a “default rule” rather than a fixed one, noting that they could have
“stated that international organizations ‘shall enjoy absolute
immunity from suit,’ or specified some other fixed level of
immunity.”82 This reading found support both within the language of
other provisions of the IOIA83 as well as in other statutes that “use

76. Jam v. Int’l Fin. Corp., 139 S. Ct. 759, 769 (2019); see also Edward Chukwuemeke
Okeke, Unpacking the Jam v. IFC Decision, 13 DIRITTI UMANI e DIRITTO
INTERNAZIONALE 297 (2019).
77. Jam, 139 S. Ct. at 771.
78. Id. at 760.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 772.
81. Id. at 768.
82. Id.
83. See 22 U.S.C. § 288a(c) (This IOIA provision renders the property and assets of
international organizations totally “immune from search.”).
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similar or identical language to place two groups on equal footing.”84
Chief Justice Roberts stated that the IFC “gets the inquiry backward”
in seeking a different immunity standard because “absent a clearly
expressed legislative intention . . . the legislative purpose is expressed
by the ordinary meaning of the words used.”85 The Supreme Court
defined the ordinary meaning of the immunity provision of the IOIA
as having adapted with the FSIA.86
Chief Justice Roberts then tackled the IFC’s contention that the
IOIA’s reference to the immunity of foreign governments is “a
specific reference to a common law concept that had a fixed meaning
. . . in 1945.”87 Chief Justice Roberts ruled that when the IOIA was
drafted in 1945, this immunity did not mean “virtually absolute
immunity.”88 By applying the reference canon, he found that the
immunity language referred to a conceptual default immunity that
was affected by what the government believed applied to them.89
Under the reference canon international organization immunity
referred to any foreign sovereign immunity rule, whether that rule be
derived or amended from existing common law, statute, or organizing
charter.90
Next, Chief Justice Roberts examined the conflicting outcome
the D.C. Circuit came to in Atkinson. The Atkinson court focused on
the President’s authority to “withhold, withdraw, condition, or limit
the otherwise applicable privileges and immunities of an international
organization.”91 The Atkinson holding thus affirmed a view that
Congress intended the IOIA to not “update itself” following a
succeeding legislative enactment.92 Chief Justice Roberts disagreed,
finding that the Atkinson court ignored the State Department’s
opinion, whose views received “special attention” in this field of the
law.93 In light of ignoring this conflicting stance, Chief Justice
84. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981(a). In the Civil Rights Act of 1866, Congress established
equal treatment of freed slaves by giving them the same property rights “as enjoyed by white
citizens.”; see also Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 6–7 (1962) (A Federal Tort Claims
Act’s provision made the United States liable for torts “in the same manner . . . as a private
individual under like circumstances.”).
85. American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63, 68 (1982) (alterations omitted).
86. Jam, 139 S. Ct. at 769–70.
87. Id. at 769.
88. Id. at 770.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Jam, 139 S. Ct. at 770.
93. Id.; see also Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela v. Helmerich & Payne Int’l. Drilling
Co., 137 S. Ct. 1312, 1320 (finding that after the FSIA was enacted the State Department
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Roberts concluded that Atkinson’s holdings’ reliance on this single
line of statutory authority had been improper.94
Chief Justice Roberts further analyzed the question of whether
international organizations would be disproportionally affected after
being stripped of their absolute immunity.95 The IFC contended that
allowing parties to sue them under the commercial exception would
not only acutely impact multilateral development banks but also
result in a flood of foreign plaintiff litigation in U.S. courts,
potentially raising the same issues the Court had previously
adjudicated regarding the Alien Torts Claims Act.96 Chief Justice
Roberts found that subjecting these organizations to restrictive
immunity would not lead to an increase in liability. To be considered
commercial, the lending activity of an international organization
would have to satisfy the Weltover “commercial” definition.97 “The
activity must be “the type . . . by which a private party engages in
‘trade or commerce.’”98 Thus, most lending activities would not be
sufficiently “commercial” to trigger the commercial exception.99
Chief Justice Roberts further suggested that international
organizations which do lend entirely to private entities may still not
be subject to increased litigation under the FSIA because prospective
plaintiffs would fail to obtain proper jurisdiction.100
Finally, Chief Justice Roberts examined the privileges and
immunities conveyed by the IOIA.101 He again affirmed that these
immunities were “default rules” which did not confer a specific grant
took the position that IOIA and FSIA immunity were now linked, thus, restrictive sovereign
immunity governed international organizational immunity).
94. Jam, 139 S. Ct. at 770.
95. Id. at 771.
96. Id.; see Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 116–17 (2013). The
plaintiffs in Kiobel were Nigerian citizens trying to sue Dutch, British, and Nigerian oil
exploration companies by seeking damages under the ATCA. The ATCA gave federal
courts original jurisdiction over any civil action by an alien for a tort which violated
international law or a United States treaty. The majority in Kiobel held that the ATCA did
not apply to claims arising outside the United States, citing in part that allowing these claims
would lead to a massive influx of foreign cases reaching the United States.
97. Jam, 139 S. Ct. at 771.
98. See supra note 71.
99. Jam, 139 S. Ct at 772; see OBB Personenverkehr AG v. Sachs, 136 S. Ct. 390, 397
(2015) (affirming that under 28 U.S.C. § 1603 a commercial activity must have a sufficient
nexus to the United States to qualify for suit).
100. Jam, 139 S. Ct at 772; see also Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 356–59
(1993) (finding that a lawsuit based on the commercial exception must satisfy the
requirements of the commercial exception as applied to tortious activity abroad, rather than
the FSIA commercial exception).
101. Jam, 139 S. Ct. at 765–66.
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of absolute immunity to a qualifying international organization.102 He
noted that international organizations had, through these default rules,
the ability to specify a different level of immunity.103 Several
international organizations, including the UN, had specific provisions
in their organizing charters which exempted them from liability.104
Comparatively, the IFC’s own charter did not state that it was
“absolutely immune from suit.”105 Thus, international organizations
appeared to have already understood that they would not always
enjoy absolute sovereign immunity in U.S. courts, and should have
written similar exemption language into their own organizing
charters.106 Chief Justice Roberts finally concluded that the IFC’s
assertion that application of the FSIA’s exceptions would result in
international organizations receiving “unlimited exposure to suit” did
not match the actual impact the ruling would have.107
V. THE DISSENT
Justice Stephen Breyer issued the lone dissent in the Jam
decision.108 He argued that the immunity contained within the IOIA
did not evolve after the passage of the FSIA.109 Instead, Justice
Breyer stated that an IOIA analysis must contend with “the statute’s
history, its context, its purposes, and its consequences” to understand
Congress’s intent.110 Justice Breyer also argued against the majorities
dynamic interpretation of the reference canon.111 Finally, Justice
102. Id. at 771.
103. Id. This process is not as simple as the Chief Justice made it seem. The vast
majority of multilevel financial institutions cannot amend their charters without a vote by
their member states. In some, such as the Inter-American Development Bank, this vote must
be unanimous while others, like the IFC, require a majority. Such an amendment would be
incredibly unlikely, as many member states would likely wish to preserve the opportunity for
redress of claims by a comparatively safe U.S. court should a loan agreement cause
unforeseen harm while other members may disagree on the level of immunity the
organization should grant itself.
104. Id. at 771-72 (“See e.g., Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the United
Nations, Art. II, para. 2, Feb. 13, 1946, 21 U.S.T. 1422, T.I.A.S. No. 6900 (“The United
Nations . . . shall enjoy immunity from every form of legal process except insofar as in any
particular case it has expressly waived its immunity.”); Articles of Agreement of the
International Monetary Fund, Art. IX, para. 3, Dec. 27, 1945, 60 Stat. 1413, T.I.A.S. No.
1501 (The IMF enjoys “immunity from every form of judicial process except to the extent
that it expressly waives its immunity.”)).
105. Jam, 139 S. Ct at 772.
106. See supra notes 104-05.
107. Jam, 139 S. Ct at 772.
108. Id.
109. Jam, 139 S. Ct. at 772-73.
110. Id. at 773.
111. See infra note 112.
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Breyer contended that the majority’s decision to rest their judgment
“primarily upon the statute’s language and canons of interpretation”
lead to dire unintended consequences for the affected international
organizations.112
In his dissent, Justice Breyer stated that he viewed the IOIA as
granting international organizations the same absolute immunity from
prosecution they enjoyed in 1945.113 He criticized the majority for
not properly considering the IOIA’s “history, its context, its purposes,
and its consequences.”114 Justice Breyer first rejected the majority’s
use of the reference canon; instead attempting to figure out the proper
method a court should use when examining ambiguous statutory
language.115 He reasoned that a court could evaluate ambiguous
statutory language as being fixed statically in the period of time the
statute was written; however courts could also interpret the language
as dynamically changing over time as outlined by the reference
canon.116 Justice Breyer wrote that there was no universal application
of this concept, thus the majorities reliance solely on the dynamic
interpretation of sovereign immunity without proper weight of the
static interpretation was a major deficiency in their argument.117
Justice Breyer next examined whether the application of the
reference canon to the IOIA’s language provided a correct and
complete interpretation of the statute.118 He found that while the
application of the canon did affirm the majorities viewpoint, this
finding itself was not dispositive.119 The author of the reference
canon had written that “[n]o single canon of interpretation can
purport to give a certain and unerring answer.”120 Additionally,
casebooks including the book which defined the reference canon had
also stated that a static or dynamic interpretation of a statute was
“fundamentally a question of legislative intent and purpose.”121
112. Jam, 132 S. Ct. at 772-73.
113. Id. at 773.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.; compare Republic of Arg. v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 612–13 (1992)
(adopting a static meaning of “commercial” which had been “attached to that term under the
restrictive theory” when the FSIA was enacted in 1976); with Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v.
Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 275–76 (1995) (interpreting the term “involving commerce” in the
Federal Arbitration Act dynamically).
117. Jam, 139 S. Ct at 773, 775.
118. Id. at 774.
119. Id.
120. Id.at 775 (citing 2 J. Sutherland, Statutory Construction § 4501 (3d ed. 1943)).
121. Jam, 139 S. Ct at 775; (citing Fox, Effect of Modification or Repeal of
Constitutional or Statutory Provision Adopted by Reference in Another Provision, 168 A. L.
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Accordingly, solely examining the language of the IOIA without
considering historical context would not properly solve the statutory
interpretation question.122
Citing his concurrence in Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson, Justice
Breyer argued that consideration of the historical context, purpose,
and related consequences of the IOIA should have led to a different
result than the majorities holding.123 In examining the Congressional
reports written prior to the passage of the IOIA, Justice Breyer first
argued that the IOIA was similar to other international organizational
agreements the United States entered into in 1945.124 These
agreements granted the organizations broad immunity from suit
within the United States, and at the time they were written Congress
appeared to have understood this point.125 He further contended that
“Congress likely recognized that immunity in the commercial area”
was vastly important to international organizations, because
international organizations “are not sovereign entities engaged in a
host of different activities.”126 Thus, the immunity the IOIA
conveyed should have remained absolute.127
Justice Breyer noted that many international organizations were
originally dependent on the IOIA to maintain absolute sovereign
immunity.128
For instance the United Nations Relief and
Rehabilitation Administration (“UNRRA”) primarily relied on the
IOIA to enforce its own absolute sovereign immunity until 1970.129
By 1950, the UNRRA had shipped billions of pounds of relief
supplies to post-WWII Europe in a process which involved extensive
R. 627, 628 (1947); see also 82 C. J. S., Statutes § 485, p. 637 (2009). (“The question of
whether a statute which has adopted another statute by reference will be affected by
amendments made to the adopted statute is one of legislative intent and purpose.”)).
122. Jam, 139 S. Ct at 775.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 775–76 (citing Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, Art.
IX, § 3, Dec. 27, 1945 (The IMF provides that they “shall enjoy immunity from every form
of judicial process except to the extent that it expressly waives its immunity.”); Charter of
the United Nations, Art. 105, 59 Stat. 1053, June 26, 1945, T. S. No. 993. (providing that the
UN had the immunities as were necessary to fulfill its purpose which Congress interpreted to
be an absolute sovereign immunity from prosecution)).
125. Jam, 139 S. Ct at 776.
126. Id. (citing Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, Art. II, §
2, Feb. 13, 1946, 21 U.S.T. 1422, T. I. A. S. No. 6900 (entered into force Apr. 29, 1970)).
The UN and its constituent organizations made it clear in 1946 that the UN needed absolute
immunity from suit, which until 1970 was derived from the immunity’s clause of the IOIA.
127. Jam, 139 S. Ct. at 776–77.
128. Id. at 777. Note that the IMF is an exception to this rule, as the IMF was expressly
granted absolute immunity from prosecution by an act of Congress.
129. Id.
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contractual relationships for the transport of commercial goods with
private U.S. entities.130 With this historical context, Justice Breyer
found that Congress enacted the IOIA to provide absolute immunity
to international organizations and that this immunity was, absent an
express revocation, intended to be static in its application.131
Justice Breyer then examined how the decision in Jam affected
international organizations which continued to engage in commercial
activities while deriving immunity from the IOIA.132 He cautioned
that the application of the commercial activity exception to all
international organizations would result in uncertainty for any
international organization involved in finance.133 For example, the
World Bank encourages development by guaranteeing and providing
private loans through its own private capital, which under the
majorities holding would be a commercial activity open to suit.134
This broad exposure to liability both undercut Congress’ original
objectives in regards to the IOIA and exposed these organizations to
liability in cases arising from a commercial activity.135
Finally, Justice Breyer discussed whether the Jam ruling would
defy the judicial goal “of weeding out lawsuits that are bad or
harmful.”136 He noted that many international organizations have
their own accountability mechanisms which obviated the need for a
domestic courts involvement and are multilateral, a structure which is
threatened by allowing one nation to apply its own liability rules and
restrict the organizations’ immunity.137 Justice Breyer noted that the
130. Id. (“Indeed, the United States condition[ed] its participation on UNRRA’s spending
[by ensuring] what amounted to 67% of its budget [was spent] on purchases of goods and
services in the United States.” (citing B. Shephard, “The Long Road Home: The Aftermath
of the Second World War” 54, 57–58 (2012))). The immunity they had under the IOIA
allowed them to make these purchases without being subject to liability in U.S. courts.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 778. These organizations include but are not limited to; the Food and
Agriculture Organization, the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, and the
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency.
133. Id; see also Republic of Arg. v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 614 (1992) (finding
that a contract to buy army boots or even bullets is a ‘commercial’ activity,’ even if the
government had entered into that contract to “fulfil[l] uniquely sovereign objectives”).
134. Jam, 139 S. Ct. at 779 (citing Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development, Art. I, Dec. 27, 1945, 60 Stat. 1440, T. I. A. S. No. 1502).
135. Id. at 779.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 779-780 (citing Broadbent v. Org. of Am. States, 628 F.2d 27, 35 (CADC
1980) (noting “[i]t would be inappropriate for municipal courts to cut deep into the region of
autonomous decision-making authority of institutions such as the World Bank.”);
Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, Art. VIII, § 29, 21 U.S.T.
1438, T. I. A. S. No. 6900 (outlining the UN’s use of alternative dispute resolution courts to
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IOIA gave the President the ability to “withdraw” and “limit” any of
the acts immunities provisions in response to a lawsuit.138 Justice
Breyer concluded that while the majorities opinion may not have
rested on erroneous legal grounds, the opinion still did not
sufficiently account for the statutory purpose of the IOIA.139
VI. THE ARGUMENT
As a result of the Jam decision, international organizations in
the United States are now subject to restricted immunity from
liability under the FSIA.140 However, the effect the new combined
IOIA/FSIA rule will have on international organizations has been left
to Congress, the organizations themselves, or the lower courts to
decide.141 One method of solving the issues Jam raised rests on the
adoption of the doctrine of functional immunity, which exempts
organizations from liability from suits arising out of the organizations
core functions while allowing them to be sued in all other respects.142
In many nations which host international organizations aside from the
United States, functional immunity has already been effectively
adopted.143
A. International Organizations in the United States Are Now
Subject to Restricted Immunity from Liability
Despite some glaring omissions, Chief Justice Roberts majority
was correct in deciding that the immunity conveyed by the IOIA was
merely a “default rule” which updated with general changes to
foreign sovereign immunity.144 There are two main grounds that the
majority used to justify this decision: (1) the lack of a differing
textual basis to update the IOIA’s immunity; and (2) the comparative
solve disputes, including commercial disputes); World Bank, Inspection Panel: About Us,
The World Bank Group (last visited Oct. 23, 2019), https://inspectionpanel.org/aboutus/about-inspection-panel (describing the World Banks internal accountability mechanisms,
including the Office of Suspension and The World Bank Group Sanctions Board)).
138. Id. at 780. Additional concerns that arise from this decision are that it impacts both
the executive branches ability to restrict an international organization’s immunity and the
organizations accountability measures. For example, the direct beneficiary of a World Bank
loan can generally sue the World Bank through its internal accountability system so long as
the suit did not lead to a “disruptive interference” with the organization’s functions. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 781.
141. See Arato, supra note 11.
142. Id.
143. Carson Young, The Limits of International Organization Immunity: An Argument
for a Restrictive Theory of Immunity Under the IOIA, 95 TEX. L. REV. 889, 908 (2017).
144. Jam, 139 S. Ct. at 771.
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statutes that similarly established a “parity of treatment” between
differing parties.145 Under the “reference canon” of statutory
interpretation, the IOIA’s reference to immunity is essentially tied to
that of foreign governmental immunity.146 As the majority correctly
stated, the “IOIA’s reference to the immunity enjoyed by foreign
governments is a general rather than specific reference.”147 There is
no evidence within the text of the IOIA that this reference to foreign
governmental immunity was intended to statically fix international
organizational immunity in the post-Berizzi Bros. absolutism of
1945.148 Nor is there any available evidence suggesting that the
Congress of 1945 had a fixed idea of what international
organizational immunity would be, because the modern conception of
international organizations did not exist until then. From a textualist
standpoint, the application of the reference cannon to an ambiguous
and general statutory provision is an entirely permissible method of
deciding this case.149
The majority’s decision that international organizational
immunity was effectively a default rule of immunity is strengthened
by a comparative statutory point which neither the majority nor the
dissent effectively contend with.150
While some international
organizations are subject to the exceptions of the FSIA, international
organizations retain the ability to specify the level of immunity they
wish to have in domestic courts.151 Since the IOIA conveyed a
default rule of sovereign immunity, nothing prevents an international
organization from amending their organizing charter and specifying
that they have absolute immunity from prosecution.152 The majority
and dissent both cite to the fact that the UN and the IMF have
absolute immunity from suit via categorical language which
explicitly states that they have absolute immunity from
prosecution.153 The issue the IFC, the World Bank, the InterAmerican Development Bank, and many other international
145. Diane Desierto, SCOTUS Decision in Jam et al v. International Finance
Corporation (IFC) Denies Absolute Immunity to IFC…With Caveats, EJIL:Talk! (February
28, 2019), https://www.ejiltalk.org/scotus-decision-in-jam-et-al-v-international-financecorporation-ifc-denies-absolute-immunity-to-ifc-with-caveats/.
146. Id.
147. Jam, 139 S. Ct. at 769.
148. Id.
149. Jam, 139 S. Ct. at 769.
150. Desierto, supra note 145.
151. Jam, 139 S. Ct. at 769.
152. Id. at 764.
153. Id. at 765, 776.
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organizations have as a result of Jam stems from the fact that their
charters contain no definition of their own institutional immunity.154
The majority opinion effectively suggests that while many
international organizations are subject to the exceptions to immunity
raised by the FSIA, a strategic amendment to their charter would
result in international organizations regaining the right to absolute
sovereign immunity once more.155
B. How the new IOIA/FSIA rule should be applied
The Jam decision concluded that the default rule of immunity
contained within the IOIA gives international organizations “the
same immunity from suit” as is effectively given to foreign
sovereigns under the FSIA.156 The 85 international organizations
which still derive immunity from the IOIA are as a result subject to
the FSIA’s sovereign immunity exceptions.157 This means that
international organizations “are therefore not absolutely immune
from suit.”158 But if this is the case, then what kind of restrictive
immunity are international organizations subjected to under this new
default rule? In theory, the simplest answer would be to find that
international organizations are subject to an identical level of
immunity as foreign sovereigns.159 In practice, this equivalency
would prove impossible to implement without some form of
modification.160
The FSIA approach to restrictive immunity is predicated on
strong national sovereignty, or the presumption that, aside from very
few exceptions, independent nations have a right to exist without
other nations interfering in domestic affairs.161 As Justice Breyer
correctly noted, however, “international organizations are not
sovereign entities.”162 An international organization is an alliance of
many individual sovereigns or private individuals coming together to
154. See Okeke, supra note 76, at 303-04.
155. Id. at 304.
156. Jam, 139 S. Ct. at 772.
157. Marco Simons, Jam v. IFC – some questions and answers after the Supreme Court’s
ruling, EARTHRIGHTS INT’L (Mar. 4, 2019), https://earthrights.org/blog/which-internationalorganizations-will-be-affected-most-by-the-supreme-courts-ruling/.
158. See Arato, supra note 11.
159. Id.
160. See Cedric Ryngaert, The Immunity of International Organizations before Domestic
Courts: Recent Trends, 7 INT’L ORG. L. REV. 121 (2010).
161. Janice E. Thomson, State Sovereignty in International Relations: Bridging the Gap
between Theory and Empirical Research, 39 (2) INT’L STUD. Q. 213–33 (1995).
162. Jam, 139 S. Ct. at 776 (emphasis added).
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advocate and preserve a collective goal or mandate.163 International
organizations do not act with “sovereign authority,” and international
organizational sovereign immunity does not have the strength of
national sovereign immunity.164
Yet the FSIA’s exceptions to international immunity are keyed
to a preexisting rule of strong sovereign immunity that is much
broader in scope, and the Court has repeatedly tied the FSIA
exceptions to state sovereignty.165 In Weltover, the Court stated that
national sovereign immunity did not apply to “commercial activities”
that were sufficiently private in nature.166 Under the FSIA, if a nation
undertook a sufficiently private action, they would automatically
forfeit their immunity.167 As international organizations are not
sovereigns, any action they undertake that sufficiently resembles
private activity, from million-dollar loans to rental contracts for
office space, would be sufficiently commercial to exempt the
organizations sovereign immunity.168
Neither the majority nor the dissent in Jam discuss the problem
of actually applying this default rule to future litigation involving
international organizations and the FSIA exceptions.169 A solution to
this problem does not appear to be immediately forthcoming either,
owing to both current Congressional gridlock and the difficulties
amending many international organizations charters.170 Congress
could amend the IOIA to explicitly codify the doctrine of absolute
sovereign immunity or update the FSIA to delineate how the FSIA’s
exceptions apply to international organizational immunity.171
Considering the difficulty courts have had in applying the FSIA’s
exceptions to cases involving national governments, however, this

163. Dan Sarooshi. Conferrals by States of Powers on International Organizations: a
Typology, in INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND THEIR EXERCISE OF SOVEREIGN
POWERS (2007).
164. See Rosalyn Higgins, PROBLEMS & PROCESS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HOW WE
USE IT, 93, 95 (1994).
165. Arato, supra note 11.
166. Republic of Arg. v. Weltover, 504 U.S. 607, 614 (1992); see also Saudi Arabia v.
Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 359-360 (1993).
167. Arato, supra note 11.
168. Simons, supra note 157.
169. Arato, supra note 11.
170. Id.
171. Id. The latter possibility is not without merit. Congress has amended the FSIA in
the past, in large part to strip nations that are accused of sponsoring terrorism from immunity
in state courts. However, Congress has never amended the IOIA, nor has Congress amended
the FSIA with regards to the commercial activity’s exception.
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seems unlikely.172 International organizations could also sidestep the
problem entirely by, as Chief Justice Roberts suggested, amending
their organizing charter to specify whatever level of institutional
immunity they wish to exercise.173 The problem is that the
international organizations most affected by the Jam ruling are IFI’s,
whose owners and shareholders are sovereign national governments
that are very likely to disagree on an amendment that would only
benefit some of the member states.174 In order to pass an amendment
to the organization’s charter, there would need to be a sufficiently
powerful voting block that could overcome the threshold needed to
pass the amendment.175
C. Functional Immunity: A Possible Solution
Absent clarification, U.S. courts will have to figure out a means
of analogizing between an international organization’s acts and the
FSIA’s exceptions to sovereign immunity. International customary
law may offer a solution to this translation problem via the principle
of functional immunity.176 Functional immunity is a form of
172. See e.g., Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 124-25 (2013)
(finding that the Alien Tort Statute did not apply to extraterritorial claims despite the lack of
definition Congress provided for what an extraterritorial act entailed); Weltover, 504 U.S. at
614 (1992) (bemoaning the lack of Congressional guidance as to what constituted a
“commercial act” under the FSIA, the Court defined the activity as being rooted in how
private the activity appeared); Republic of Arg. v. NML Capital, Ltd., 573 U.S. 134, 144-45
(2014). In a debt default case Argentina claimed that its foreign assets were immune from
discovery proceedings. The Supreme Court held that, because Congress did not and has not
specified whether post judgement discovery fell under protected sovereign immunity, then
this immunity must be considered not to exist until Congress clarified its position. Id.
173. See Jam, 139 S. Ct at 771 (holding that “if the work of a [] international organization
would be impaired by restrictive immunity, the organization’s charter can [] specify a
different level of immunity.”).
174. Id. at 776; see also Michael Singer, Jurisdictional Immunity of International
Organizations: Human Rights and Functional Necessity Concerns, 36 VA. J. INT’L L. 53
(1996).
175. Arato, supra note 11; see also World Bank Group Finances, WORLD BANK GROUP,
Oct. 17, 2019, (last accessed 11/14/2019), https://finances.worldbank.org/ShareholderEquity/IFC-Subscriptions-and-Voting-Power-of-Member-Count/gsdw-avpz.
The
IFC
provides us with one such example of this difficulty. The IFC requires a “vote of three-fifths
of the Governors exercising eighty-five percent of the total voting power” for amendments.
The United States holds 22.19% of the total voting power in the IFC, thus even if every other
member country voted to amend the articles of agreement of the IFC to grant them
immunity, the United States could unilaterally block the measure. Since the U.S. government
supported the Supreme Court’s Jam ruling, it is unlikely that this measure would be
successful. Id.
176. Reparations For Injury Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Request for
Advisory Opinion, 1948 I.C.J. 174 (Dec. 4); see The Paquette Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700
(1900) (“[Customary] international law is part of our law, and must be… administered by the
courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction.”); see also Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
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restrictive sovereign immunity which refers to the principal that state
officials are generally immune from the jurisdiction of other states in
relation to acts performed in their official capacity.177 The ICJ stated
in Reparations for Injury Suffered in the Service of the United
Nations that “the subjecthood of international organizations is
functionally delimited.”178
Essentially the extent to which
international organizations should retain immunity depends on the
functions it carries out.179 Thus, rather than read the FSIA’s
exceptions to apply to any transaction an international organization is
engaged in, they would instead only apply to actions taken outside
the general scope of the functions the international organization had
been delegated.180
The confusion surrounding the impact of the Jam decision will,
absent guidance from the Supreme Court, result in a circuit split
regarding the application of the FSIA’s exceptions to international
organization cases.181 Functional immunity would help U.S. courts
adjudicate these cases because it would allow the courts to apply
immunity to an organization’s acts depending on the functions
delegated to it.182 For instance, commercial activities would be
weighed by whether the act was taken in “furtherance of the
organization’s functions,” instead of applying to every private
commercial interaction183 This is vital, as it allows international
organizations to maintain immunity while properly carrying out an
action they were created to advocate, but not for actions taken as a
purely private commercial actor or when an agreement is materially
breached without recourse for the victim.184
There are three main advantages of U.S. courts applying the
Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 425 (1964) (stating that federal courts are not barred from applying
customary international law).
177. Dapo Akande & Sangeeta Shah, Immunities of State Officials, International Crimes,
and Foreign Domestic Courts, 21 (4) EUR. J. OF INT’L L. 825 (2011).
178. Reparations For Injury Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Request for
Advisory Opinion, 1948 I.C.J. 174 (Dec. 4); see also Matar v. Dichter, 563 F.3d 9, 15 (2d
Cir. 2009). The rights of foreign officials to enjoy immunity from civil suit with respect to
their official acts is a jus cogens norm of international law – even including, at least in some
situations, where the state itself may lack immunity under the FSIA. Id.
179. Arato, supra note 11.
180. Id.
181. Clifford Wallace, The Nature and Extent of Intercircuit Conflicts: A Solution
Needed for a Mountain or a Molehill, 71 CAL. L. REV. 913 (1983) (assessing why circuit
spits can create legal confusion subsequent to confusing Supreme Court rulings).
182. Akande & Shah, supra note 177; see also Arato, supra note 10.
183. Arato, supra note 11.
184. Singer, supra note 174.
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doctrine of functional immunity. First, it would help courts evaluate
whether an international organization’s acts qualify for actual
immunity.185
This could be accomplished by comparing an
international organizations action in dispute to a similar or relevant
sovereign state action.186 If the action is one of which sovereign
states consistently enjoyed immunity under the FSIA, then
international organizations would similarly be granted immunity for
that action.187 Second, functional immunity would help distinguish
the immunity owed to different international organizations.188 Unlike
sovereign governments, who generally have equal rights in
international law, international organizations perform wildly different
functions of varying scope.189 This would address the problem that
the FSIA exceptions, particularly the commercial exception, affect
some international organizations disproportionately.190
Thus,
international organizations would retain immunity for activities
related to their core functions while still facing liability when they
stray outside those functions.191
Third, functional immunity addresses one of Justice Breyer’s
core concerns; that some organizations, for instance IFI’s such as the
World Bank and Inter-American Development Bank, carry out
activities that are entirely commercial when read under the “private
acts” language of the Weltover test.192 Under functional immunity,
these commercial activities would almost certainly retain immunity
because they are a “core purpose” of the organization.193 This would
not exempt IFI’s from all liability, especially in cases where the
185. Joseph A. Bongiorno, Sovereign Immunity and International Organization: The
Case of DeLuca v. the United Nations, 10 (2) INT’L J. POL. CULTURE SOC’Y 321-22 (1996).
186. Arato, supra note 11.
187. U.N. Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and their Property,
Privileges and Immunities, Diplomatic and Consular Relations, Etc., U.N. Doc. A/59/508
(Dec. 2, 2004). For instance, central bank accounts, buildings, and means of transportation
belonging to states to fulfill diplomatic purposes are protected from search, requisition,
attachment, or execution by any other states’ government under the Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations. These immunities would undoubtedly be extended to similar property
of international organizations. Id.
188. Arato, supra note 11.
189. Stephen Bouwhuis, The International Law Commission’s Definition of International
Organizations, 9 (2) INT’L ORG. L. REV. 451–65 (2012).
190. Jam, 139 S. Ct. at 776-77.
191. Higgins, supra note 164.
192. Jam, 139 S. Ct. at 773.
193. WBG Establishing IFC, Articles of Agreement, Art. VI(1) (as amended through
June 27, 2012) (The IFC immunities provision seems to affirm this principle, as it
enumerates limited immunities “[t]o enable[] the Corporation to fulfill its functions.”); see
also Singer, supra note 174.
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organization breached provisions of its own charter like the situation
in Jam.194 Instead, functional immunity would allow U.S. courts to
hear a reduced number of cases stemming from organizations that are
disproportionately affected by the Jam decision, while still enforcing
the FSIA’s exceptions in a more general sense.195
But functional immunity has its own issues. Absent wellunderstood definitions of an international organization’s core
functions, courts may be tempted to read the scope of functional
immunity too broadly in comparison to the organization’s actual
functions.196 Since functional immunity presumes that potential suits
cannot encroach upon the organization’s core functions, lawsuits
derived from humanitarian and human rights claims may be
precluded so long as the organization is properly carrying out its
functions and has not breached its own internal rules.197 Finally,
application of functional immunity does not resolve the potential
dispute between the executive power to manage international
organizations and the legislative control of immunity.198 Yet the
allure of functionalism as a means of applying the ambiguous default
rule of the Jam decision cannot be understated.199 Under a functional
immunity regime, immunity would only attach if truly necessary for
the performance of the international organization’s functions and the
realization of its goals, a doctrine which can much more easily absorb
the FSIA’s restrictions than the aforementioned undefined default
rule.200 So long as international organizations can be considered
bound to the consequences of their actions that fall outside their core
functions or result from a breach of their duties, then the functional
immunity doctrine can greatly help U.S. courts fill in the gaps left by
applying the FSIA’s exceptions to international organizations.201
194. Okeke, supra note 76. Note that the IFC violated the provisions of its agreement by
not revoking its loan to Coastal Gujarat. This kind of action would still result in a waiver of
immunity for the IFC under functional immunity, as the violation did not comply with the
IFC’s internal policy regarding loan agreements. Id.
195. Arato, supra note 11.
196. See Gregor Novak & August Reinisch, THE PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES OF
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN DOMESTIC COURTS (August Reinish ed. 2013) (noting
that absent legislative or judicial definition of what an international organizations functions
are, functional immunity can become de facto absolute immunity from suit); see also Pieter
H.F. Bekker, THE LEGAL POSITION OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS: A FUNCTIONAL
NECESSITY ANALYSIS OF THEIR LEGAL STATUS AND IMMUNITIES (1994).
197. Ryngaert, supra note 160, at 130.
198. Id.
199. See Young, supra note 143.
200. Singer, supra note 174.
201. Id. at 113-114.
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D. How functional immunity is applied to international
organizations in other jurisdictions
While U.S. courts have never formally adopted functional
immunity, several other jurisdictions have applied functional
immunity to international organizations.202 Their application of
functional immunity may provide U.S. courts with guidance
regarding how the practice is defined by international custom.203 This
would in turn provide good examples for U.S. courts trying to assess
the proper scope of international organizational immunity.204 This
section will focus on Austria, the United Kingdom, and The
Netherlands; countries which have multiple international
organizations present within their borders and have faced similar
issues involving international organizational immunity.205
The Republic of Austria provides jurisdictional immunity to
over 40 of the organizations it houses.206 On its face, Austria decided
that “[i]t is settled case law that international organizations enjoy
absolute immunity.”207 However, this grant of absolute immunity
does not, in practice, resemble the pre-Jam American regime of
absolute immunity, as Austrian courts will waive this immunity if the
organization does not act within its prescribed functions.208
Additionally, Austrian-based international organization claims must
be settled by mediation through the Austrian Foreign Ministry if the
organization lacks an internal arbitration system, unlike the U.S.,
which lacks a similar compulsory arbitration mechanism for
international organization claims.209 Thus, impacted parties still have
a path towards remuneration for an international organization’s
conduct under the Austrian system, demonstrating the malleable
nature of functional immunity as applied by an international state.210

202. Young, supra note 143, at 908.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Austrian Press & Information Service in the United States, International
Organizations
in
Vienna,
EMBASSY
OF
AUSTRIA
(Nov.
19,
2019)
https://www.austria.org/international-organizations. These organizations include Amnesty
International, the International Organization for Migration, Reporters Without Borders, and
the United Nations Children’s Fund. Id.
207. Gregor Novak & August Reinisch, Austria, in THE PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES OF
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN DOMESTIC COURTS 31 (August Reinisch ed., 2013).
208. Young, supra note 143, at 909.
209. Kirsten Schmalenbach, Austrian Courts and the Immunity of International
Organizations, 10 INT’L ORG. L. REV. 446, 457-58 (2013).
210. Id.
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The United Kingdom has one of the strongest functional
immunity regimes in Europe, the result of being the host nation for
numerous international organizations.211 The UK’s grant of immunity
is grounded in the 1968 International Organisations Act (“IOA).”212
The IOA stipulates that international organizational immunity may be
granted in the case of “seven privileges” specified in the IOA.213 If an
organization’s action falls outside the specified privileges, then they
are liable for suit as a result.214 While international organizations
normally enjoy immunity from suit under these privileges, the
immunity itself may be waived “subject to parliamentary
procedure.”215 Functional immunity in the UK opens international
organizations to suit for actions taken outside of an agreed upon core
function; while also allowing for suits arising from a protected
category if Parliament determines the agency’s action was
sufficiently egregious to merit suit.216
The Netherlands is host to thirty-three international
organizations, including the International Court of Justice, the
Permanent Court of Arbitration, and the European Patent Office.217
Much like the United States, Dutch jurisdiction over international
organizations defers to the immunity provision found in either the
organizations charter or a binding multilateral immunity treaty.218 In
cases where this immunity has not been expressly stated, however,
Dutch courts adopt a more restrictive form of functional immunity.219
The Supreme Court of the Netherlands has repeatedly stressed that an
organization will be afforded immunity only after making the
determination of “whether or not the acts in question are immediately
connected to the tasks entrusted to the organization.”220 This standard
211. Dan Sarooshi & Antonios Tzanakopoulos, United Kingdom, in THE PRIVILEGES AND
IMMUNITIES OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN DOMESTIC COURTS 275 (August Reinisch
ed., 2013); see also Young, supra note 144, at 908.
212. International Organisations Act 1968, c. 48 (U.K.).
213. Id. § 1(2)(c), sch. 1.
214. Sarooshi & Tzanakopoulos, supra note 211.
215. Cabinet Office, The Cabinet Manual - Draft, (Dec. 2010), https://perma.cc/W66FHNG4.
216. Sarooshi & Tzanakopoulos, supra note 211.
217. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, List of International Organisations in the Netherlands,
(last accessed Nov. 19, 2019) https://www.government.nl/topics/internationalorganisations/multilateral-forums.
218. Rosanne van Alebeek & Andre Nollkaemper, Privileges and Immunities of
International Organizations in the Case Law of Dutch Courts, ACIL Research Paper No.
2012-11, 3 (2012).
219. Greenpeace Nederland v. Euratom, Judgment on Appeal in Cassation, ILDC 838
(NL Sup. Ct. 2007).
220. van Alebeek & Nollkaemper, supra note 219, at 17-18.
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is malleable depending on the function of the organization and can be
either over or under inclusive of immunity depending on the courts
determination of what function the organization fulfills.221 While
international organizational immunity in the Netherlands is not
codified, in practice Dutch courts have instituted a relatively sensible
functional immunity regime—an international organization, absent an
inherent immunity provision, is liable to suit for any action that
exceeds or violates its immediate functions.222
VII. CONCLUSION
The 74 years of peace enjoyed by international organizations
and U.S. courts from having to wrestle with questions of international
organization immunity is over; the doctrine of absolute sovereign
immunity in the United States is dead. The Supreme Court has left
U.S. courts in a precarious situation—how to apply the exceptions to
sovereign immunity from the FSIA to international organizations
which are not sovereigns. With intervention from Congress and an
amendment to many organization’s immunity provisions unlikely,
U.S. courts will have to craft a scheme of restrictive immunity until
the Supreme Court issues further guidance.
U.S. courts should look to the doctrine of functional immunity to
provide this answer. Current international customary law supports a
grant of immunity only as far as needed for an international
organization to fulfill its intended purposes. Functional immunity
provides courts with an effective means of applying the FSIA’s
exceptions while still allowing international organizations to carry
out their core functions. However, functional immunity is not likely
to be a permanent solution to the default IOIA/FSIA immunity rule.
Without inquiry establishing what an organizations function is,
functionalism can devolve into absolute immunity in all but name,
and functional immunity is not a particularly effective means of
adjudicating claims by third parties. Yet despite this contestation,
functional immunity provides courts with a malleable doctrine that
grants international organizations the immunity necessary to function
while still holding them accountable for overstepping their
221. Compare Mothers of Srebrenica et al v. The Netherlands & the UN, (2012)
10/04437 (Sup. Ct. Neth.) (finding that UN constituent organizations enjoy absolute
immunity from prosecution due to the absolute immunities clause of its organizing charter);
with European Patent Office v. Stichting Restaurant De La Tour, (2011) 200.065.887 (Ct.
App. The Hague) (holding that the EPO only enjoys immunity for activities “that are strictly
necessary for its administrative and technical operation.”).
222. van Alebeek & Nollkaemper, supra note 219, at 17-18.
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boundaries. While not perfect, functional immunity remains the best
available way to apply the new default IOIA/FSIA restrictive
immunity doctrine to international organizations.

